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PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
Nos. 12-3401/3501 
_____________ 
 
CHRIST THE KING MANOR, INC.; BALDOCK 
ASSOCIATES, d/b/a Baldock Health Care Center; 
BONHAM NURSING CENTER; BRIARLEAF NURSING 
AND CONVALESCENT CENTER, INC.; BROOKMONT 
HEALTH CARE CENTER, LLC; CATHEDRAL VILLAGE; 
ELLEN MEMORIAL HEALTH CARE CENTER-
HONESDALE, INC.; GREENLEAF NURSING AND 
CONVALESCENT CENTER, INC.; HUMBERT LANE 
ASSSOCIATES, d/b/a Humbert Lane Nursing and 
Rehabilitation Center; JEWISH HOME OF GREATER 
HARRISBURG; KINKORA PYTHIAN HOME 
CORPORATION; KUTZTOWN MANOR, INC.; 
MISERICORDIA  CONVALESCENT HOME; CPSR 
ASSOCIATES, LLC, d/b/a Mon Valley Care Center; 
PICKERING MANOR HOME; 4144 SCHAPER AVENUE 
OPERATING COMPANY, LLC, d/b/a Presque Isle 
Rehabilitation & Nursing Center; RHEEMS NURSING AND 
REHABILITATION, LLC; RESIDENCE FOR RENTAL 
CARE AT SHADYSIDE, LTD; PERINI 
SERVICE/SOUTHHAMPTON MANOR LIMITED, d/b/a 
Shippensburg Health Care Center; SIEMON NURSING 
HOME, INC.; WINDSOR, IN.C, d/b/a Snyder Memorial 
Health Care Center; SOUTHWESTERN GROUP, LTD, d/b/a 
Southwestern Nursing Center; CARBON-SCHUYLKILL 
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COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, INC., d/b/a St. Luke's Miners 
Memorial Geriatric Center; SUSQUEHANNA VALLEY 
NURSING AND REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC; 890 
WEATHERWOOD LANE OPERATING COMPANY, LLC, 
d/b/a The Rehabilitation and Nursing Center at Greater 
Pittsburgh; WESTWOOD OPERARTOR, L.P., d/b/a Village 
at Pennwood; MISERICORDIA CONVALESCENT HOME 
 
v. 
 
SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; CHARLENE 
FRIZZERA, in her official capacity as Acting Administrator 
of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS); 
HARRIET DICHTER, in her official capacity as Secretary of 
Public Welfare for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 
Department of Public Welfare 
 
CHRIST THE KING MANOR, INC.; BONHAM NURSING 
CENTER; CATHEDRAL VILLAGE; ELLEN MEMORIAL 
HEALTH CARE CENTER-HONESDALE, INC.; 
SUSQUEHANNA VALLEY NURSING AND 
REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC; 
RHEEMS NURSING & REHABILITATION, LLC 
SOUTHWESTERN GROUP, LTD. d/b/a Southwestern 
Nursing Center; CPSR ASSOCIATES, LLC d/b/a Mon 
Valley Care Center; KINKORA PYTHIAN HOME CORP.; 
SIEMON NURSING HOME, INC. d/b/a Siemon's Lakeview 
Manor Estate; 4114 SCHAPER AVENUE OPERATING 
CO., LLC d/b/a Presque Isle Rehabilitation & Nursing 
Center; 890 WEATHERWOOD LANE OPERATING 
COMPANY, LLC d/b/a The Rehabilitation and Nursing 
center at Greater Pittsburgh; BRIARLEAF NURSING & 
 3 
 
CONVALESCENT CENTER, INC.; BROOKMOMT 
HEALTH CARE CENTER; KUTZTOWN MANOR, INC.; 
GREENLEAF NURSING AND COVALESCENT CENTER; 
WINDOSR, INC. d/b/a Snyder memorial Health Care Center; 
CARBON-SCHUYKILL COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, INC. 
d/b/a St. Luke's Miner's Memorial Geriatric Center; 
PICKERING MANOR HOME, 
                                 Appellants in 12-3401 
 
BALDOCK ASSOCIATES, d/b/a Baldock Health Care 
Center; HUMBERT LANE ASSOCIATES, d/b/a Humbert 
Lane Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, 
                                                                                                                                                       
     Appellants in 12-3501 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 09-cv-02007) 
District Judge:  Hon. John E. Jones, III  
_______________ 
 
Argued: May 31, 2013 
 
Before:   JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges, and 
RAKOFF*, Senior District Judge. 
 
 
_______________ 
  * Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District 
Court Senior Judge for the Southern District of New York, 
sitting by designation. 
 (Filed: September 19, 2013) 
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_______________ 
 
Daniel K. Natirboff   [ARGUED] 
Capozzi & Associates 
P.O. Box 5866 
Harrisburg, PA   17110 
          Counsel for Appellants 
 
Sheila Lieber 
United States Dep’t of Justice 
Federal Programs Branch 
901 E Street, NW 
Washington, DC   20004 
 
Jeffrey E. Sandberg   [ARGUED] 
United States Dep’t of Justice 
Appellate Section 
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 
Washington, DC   20530 
          Counsel for Appellees 
 
Patrick S. Crawley 
Sean A. Kirkpatrick   [ARGUED] 
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania 
Strawberry Square – 15th Fl. 
Harrisburg, PA   17120 
          Counsel for Appellee Harriet Dichter 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
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 This appeal arises from a challenge to the approval by 
the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and 
Human Services (“the Secretary” or “HHS”) of a 2008 
amendment to Pennsylvania’s state plan for administering its 
Medicaid program.  Numerous private nursing facilities that 
provide services to Medicaid recipients argue that the state 
plan amendment, or “SPA,” violates Title XIX of the Social 
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq. (the “Medicaid Act” 
or the “Act”).  Specifically, they contend that the SPA 
adjusted Pennsylvania’s method for determining Medicaid 
reimbursement rates to private nursing facilities for the 2008-
09 fiscal year without considering quality of care, which they 
say violates 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (“Section 30(A)”), 
and without satisfying the public process requirements of 42 
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (“Section 13(A)”).  To remedy 
those alleged violations, Plaintiffs invoke the Administrative 
Procedure Act (the “APA”) and the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution, and seek declaratory and injunctive relief 
against the Secretary, the Administrator of the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) (collectively, the 
“Federal Defendants”), and the Secretary of Pennsylvania’s 
Department of Public Welfare (“DPW” or the “State 
Defendant”).1  The District Court granted in part the 
Defendants’ motions to dismiss, and then entered summary 
                                              
1
  When the nursing facilities first brought suit, the 
Secretary of DPW was Estelle B. Richman, and the 
Administrator of CMS was Charlene Frizzera.  Since then, 
others have served in both positions.  The current Secretary of 
DPW is Gary D. Alexander, and the current Administrator of 
CMS is Marilyn Tavenner.  Kathleen Sebelius has been the 
Secretary of HHS since the complaint was filed.      
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judgment in their favor on the remaining claims.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm those rulings in part and 
reverse them in part. 
 
I. Background 
 
 A. Factual and Statutory Background 
 
 Medicaid is “a cooperative federal-state program that 
provides medical care to needy individuals.”  Douglas v. 
Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1208 (2012).  
States that choose to participate in the program are 
responsible for developing and implementing a state 
Medicaid plan and have considerable control over the plan’s 
details and administration.  Pa. Pharmacists Ass’n v. 
Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531, 533 (3d Cir. 2002) (en banc) (citing 
Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 502 (1990)).  In 
order to qualify for federal funding, however, a state plan 
must comply with the requirements of the Medicaid Act.  42 
U.S.C. § 1396a (defining the requirements a state plan must 
satisfy for approval); id. § 1396b(a) (providing for federal 
payments “to each [s]tate which has a plan approved”).  
Those requirements include, among other things, the so-called 
“equal access provision” of Section 30(A), which mandates 
that a state plan provide “methods and procedures” to assure 
that the state pays participating nursing facilities and other 
Medicaid providers at rates that are consistent with efficiency, 
economy, quality of care, and adequate access to providers by 
Medicaid beneficiaries.  42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A); see 
Ark. Med. Soc’y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 522 (8th Cir. 
1993) (explaining that Section 30(A) “is typically called the 
equal access provision”).  State plans must also satisfy 
Section 13(A) of the Act, which requires that rates of 
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payment to hospitals and nursing facilities be determined 
using a public process similar to notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.  42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A).    
 
 CMS is the division of HHS tasked with ensuring that 
state plans comply with those and other requirements of the 
Medicaid Act.  States must submit their proposed plans to 
CMS, and the agency must review each plan, “make a 
determination as to whether it conforms to the requirements 
for approval,” 42 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1), and “approve any plan 
which fulfills the conditions specified” in the Medicaid Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b).  See also 42 C.F.R. § 430.12 
(describing the submittal of state plans to CMS).  A state may 
later amend an approved plan, but any amendments must also 
be submitted to CMS, and the agency must “determine 
whether the [amended] plan continues to meet the 
requirements for approval.”   42 C.F.R. § 430.12(c)(2)(i).  
States are required to amend their plans “whenever necessary 
to reflect,” among other things, “[m]aterial changes in State 
law, organization, or policy, or in the State’s operation of the 
Medicaid program.”  Id.     
 
 Pennsylvania has elected to participate in the Medicaid 
program, and it has designated DPW as the “single [s]tate 
agency” responsible for creating and administering the state’s 
Medicaid plan.
2
  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5) (requiring states 
to establish or designate “a single [s]tate agency to administer 
… the plan”).  Since 1996, Pennsylvania, in accordance with 
an approved state plan, has paid participating nursing 
                                              
 
2
 Recognizing that Pennsylvania is typically referred to 
as a “Commonwealth,” we nonetheless use the term “state,” 
for ease of reference.  
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facilities for Medicaid-related services using an “annual 
prospective payment rate” often referred to as the “case-mix 
rate.”3  See 55 Pa. Code § 1187.95 (“Prices will be set 
prospectively on an annual basis … .”); Christ the King 
Manor v. Pennsylvania, 911 A.2d 624, 630 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2006) (“Since July 1996, DPW compensated both public and 
private nursing facilities through its [Medicaid] program 
under what is known as the case-mix payment system.”).  
DPW calculates the “case-mix rate” using a complex formula 
that produces an individualized per diem reimbursement rate 
for each facility based on the “allowable costs” incurred by 
facilities,
4
 the acuity level of residents,
5
 and other factors.  
See 55 Pa. Code § 1187.96 (describing the “[p]rice and rate-
setting computations”).  (See also J.A. at 232-242 
(Pennsylvania’s State Plan).)  The rate is effective for one 
year, from July 1 through the following June 30, and it is 
adjusted quarterly, based on resident acuity. 55 Pa. Code § 
1187.95(a).   
                                              
 
3
  Pennsylvania uses the term “rate” in this context to 
mean payment level, and we adopt that usage, even though 
“rate” is often used to refer to “the proportion by which 
quantity or value is adjusted.”  See Black’s Law Dictionary 
1289 (8th ed. 2004).   
4
 Pennsylvania defines “allowable costs” as costs 
“which are necessary and reasonable for an efficiently and 
economically operated nursing facility to provide services to 
[Medicaid] residents.”  55 Pa. Code Ann. § 1187.2.   
5
 “Acuity” refers to the severity of illness a patient 
experiences.  See Stedman’s Medical Dictionary (28th ed.), at 
22.   
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 Under that methodology, Pennsylvania’s 
reimbursement rates to nursing facilities have risen steadily 
each year, and, beginning in 2000, the state grew concerned 
that the pace of that inflation was creating unsustainable 
costs.  In June 2005, DPW announced that reimbursement 
rates had increased by 29.4% over the previous five years, 
and that, unless rates were somehow limited, there would be 
“insufficient funds available to make case-mix payments to 
[Medicaid] nursing facilities in accordance with the existing 
case-mix payment methodology.”  35 Pa. Bull. 3267 (June 4, 
2005).  Therefore, after soliciting public comments and 
receiving input from Pennsylvania’s Medical Assistance 
Advisory Committee,
6
 DPW proposed using a budget 
adjustment factor, or “BAF,” to slow the increasing rates.     
 
 As it has come to be used in Pennsylvania, a BAF is a 
fraction by which each provider’s case-mix payment rate is 
multiplied, thereby reducing the reimbursement rate by a 
certain percentage.  For example, if a case-mix rate of $100 
was multiplied by a BAF of 0.900, the resulting 
reimbursement rate would be $90, or 10% less than what was 
called for by the case-mix calculation.  Under the 
methodology proposed by DPW in 2005, the size of the BAF 
was to be dictated by the funds appropriated by the state 
legislature for payments to nursing facilities for the 2005-06 
fiscal year.  Application of the BAF would therefore “cap” 
payments to providers based on budget allocation decisions 
by the Pennsylvania legislature.  35 Pa. Bull. 6232 (Nov. 12, 
                                              
 
6
  States are required to “provide for a medical care 
advisory committee … to advise the Medicaid agency 
director about health and medical care services.”  42 C.F.R. 
431.12(b).  
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2005).  For the 2005-06 fiscal year, the BAF rate cap allowed 
payments to increase by 2.8% from the previous year.  
Although the BAF reduces the case-mix rate for a given year, 
that does not necessarily mean that the adjusted rate will be 
less than it was the previous year.  As described above, rates 
calculated using the case-mix methodology have steadily 
increased each year.  If an annual increase is larger than the 
reduction imposed by the BAF in that year, then rates can still 
increase in absolute terms.  For example, if rates increased 
under the case-mix methodology by five percent from one 
year to the next, and then the BAF reduced rates by three 
percent, there would still be an overall increase in rates from 
the previous year. 
 
 Although DPW initially portrayed the BAF as “an 
interim measure, applicable only to the computation of 
payment rates for the 2005-2006 fiscal year,” id., BAFs 
became a fixture of the state’s rate-calculation methodology.  
For each year between 2005 and 2008, the Pennsylvania 
legislature authorized the use of a BAF, after which DPW 
submitted the BAF to CMS as a state plan amendment, and 
the agency approved the change.  As a result, the case-mix 
rate calculated for each of those years was reduced by the 
amount defined in that year’s BAF; the 2005-06 rates were 
reduced by 4.878%, the 2006-07 rates by 6.245%, and the 
2007-08 rates by 6.806%, as compared to what the rates 
would have been without the application of the BAF.
7
       
                                              
 
7
  The BAFs for those years were 0.95122, 0.93755, 
and 0.93194, respectively.  Because the annual case-mix rate 
is multiplied by the BAF, it is reduced by a certain 
percentage.  For example, if you multiply a case-mix rate by 
0.95122, you arrive at a figure that is 95.122% of the original 
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 On June 28, 2008, two days before the prior legislative 
authorization for a BAF was set to expire, DPW issued a 
public notice and request for comment announcing the state’s 
intent to “authorize the continued use of a budget adjustment 
factor” in calculating nursing facility payment rates.  38 Pa. 
Bull. 3561 (June 28, 2008) (the “June Notice”).  The June 
Notice explained that the continued use of a BAF would 
ensure that “the aggregate increase in the Statewide day-
weighted average payment rate … does not exceed the 
percentage rate of increase permitted by the funds 
appropriated for nursing facility services.”  Id.  It defined the 
formula for calculating the BAF, which, as in years 2005 to 
2008, was determined by the amount the legislature allocated 
for nursing facility reimbursements.  The June Notice also 
projected that for fiscal year 2008-09 the BAF would be 
0.90551, meaning that the per diem rates under the case-mix 
method would be decreased by 9.449% from what they would 
have been without the application of the BAF.  Id.  That 
projection was based on the funds allocated for nursing 
facility services in the governor’s proposed budget. 
 
 A week later, on July 4, 2008, the Pennsylvania 
legislature passed “Act 44,” 62 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 443.1(7)(iii).  
As if the bureaucratese were not already painfully thick in 
this field, the Act directed DPW to apply what it called a 
“revenue adjustment neutrality factor,” which is another term 
for a BAF, in each fiscal year between July 1, 2008 and June 
30, 2011.  62 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 443.1(7)(iii)(A).  Act 44 also 
codified the methodology announced in the June Notice, and 
                                                                                                     
rate.  That decrease amounts to the 4.878% reduction 
described above.       
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provided that “the revenue adjustment neutrality factor shall 
limit the estimated aggregate increase in the [s]tatewide day-
weighted average payment rate … to the amount permitted by 
the funds appropriated by the General Appropriations Act for 
those fiscal years.”  Id.  Translation: the BAF would continue 
to cap annual rates at the amount Pennsylvania decided it 
could afford to pay.  On the same day, the legislature enacted 
the General Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2008-09, 
which appropriated slightly more funds for nursing facility 
services than had been called for in the governor’s proposed 
budget.  Soon after those enactments, DPW published another 
notice and request for comment regarding provider rates.  38 
Pa. Bull. 3943 (July 19, 2008) (the “July Notice”).  The July 
Notice announced that DPW had calculated proposed annual 
per diem rates for 2008-09, and that, “[c]ontingent on CMS 
approval,” it would apply a BAF to those rates.  Id.   
 
 On September 30, 2008, DPW submitted a proposed 
BAF for 2008-09, designated as “SPA 08-007,” to CMS for 
approval.
8
  In a brief cover letter accompanying the SPA, 
                                              
8
  DPW actually submitted two SPAs, one regarding 
the rate-calculation methodology for private nursing facilities 
(SPA 08-007) and one regarding the calculation for public 
nursing facilities (SPA 08-008).  In their complaint, Plaintiffs 
challenge both SPAs, but they raised no specific objection to 
SPA 08-008 in the District Court or in this appeal, and they 
have therefore waived any argument against it.  See McCray 
v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 682 F.3d 229, 241 (3d Cir. 
2012) (“[A]n appellant waives an argument in support of 
reversal if he does not raise that argument in his opening brief 
… .” (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)); 
United States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 727 (3d Cir. 2010) 
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DPW explained that its purpose was “to authorize the 
continued use of the budget adjustment factor (BAF) for non-
public nursing facility payment rates for the 2008-2009 rate 
year.”  (J.A. at 191.)  The letter described the formula for 
calculating the BAF, and said that “the non-public BAF 
produced by this formula [for rate year 2008-09] is .90891.”  
(J.A. at 192.)  It further explained that the BAF served “to 
moderate the growth of nursing facility payment rates 
consistent with the fiscal resources of the Commonwealth, 
while still providing payment rate increases sufficient to 
assure that consumers will continue to have access to 
medically necessary nursing facility services.”  (J.A. at 191.)  
Finally, the letter assured CMS that Pennsylvania had 
“provided advance notice of its intent to amend its State Plan” 
by publishing public notices in the Pennsylvania Bulletin.  
(J.A. at 192.)  With the cover letter, DPW submitted to CMS 
a SPA submittal form, a chart showing that the total cost of 
the state’s Medicaid program was within the regulatory 
limits,
9
 copies of the June and July Notices, and a description 
of the methods and standards used to calculate the per diem 
payment rates.  That description did not explain the basis for 
the particular BAF proposed for 2008-09 but rather referred 
                                                                                                     
(noting the “well-established proposition that arguments not 
raised in the district courts are waived on appeal”).  In any 
event, Plaintiffs are all private nursing facilities and so were 
unaffected by the changes proposed in SPA 08-008.   
9
  Federal regulations require that Medicaid payments 
not exceed an “upper payment limit” that is defined as “a 
reasonable estimate of the amount that would be paid for the 
services furnished” under the payment principles defined in 
the Act.  42 C.F.R. 447.272(b).  
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to Pennsylvania’s statutory provisions defining the case-mix 
method and explained the use of BAFs generally.  No other 
information regarding the reasons behind the new BAF, or its 
anticipated effect on care, was included in DPW’s initial 
submission. 
 
 In November 2008, DPW published a public notice 
that included the information it had provided to CMS.  38 Pa. 
Bull. 6343 (Nov. 15, 2008) (the “November Notice”).  The 
November Notice announced that, based on the amounts 
appropriated by the state legislature, the BAF for the 2008-09 
fiscal year would be 0.90891.  Id.  That BAF was the same as 
stated in the SPA, but it differed from the estimate included in 
the June Notice because of the disparity between the 
governor’s proposed budget and the one the legislature 
actually passed, which increased appropriations to nursing 
facilities slightly.  Still, the proposed BAF represented the 
largest downward adjustment to the case-mix rate calculation 
since Pennsylvania had introduced BAFs, reducing each 
nursing facility’s proposed per diem rate by 9.109%.10  
Application of the BAF to the 2008-09 case-mix rates meant 
that, on average, provider payments would be one percent 
higher in fiscal year 2008-09 than they had been in fiscal year 
                                              
 
10
  As described above, see supra note 7 and 
accompanying text, per diem rates calculated using the case-
mix methodology are multiplied by the BAF.  A case-mix rate 
multiplied by 0.90891 (the BAF for the 2008-09 fiscal year) 
will be 90.891% of its original value.  In other words, 
application of the proposed BAF reduces the case-mix rate by 
9.109%.  Plaintiffs incorrectly state in their opening brief that 
the 2008-09 BAF “results in a reduction of 9.0891%.”  
(Appellants’ Opening Br. at 26.)   
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2007-08, due to the continuing increase in per diem rates 
under the case-mix methodology.
11
       
 
 Meanwhile, CMS was reviewing SPA 08-007.  Keith 
Leuschner, the CMS employee responsible for reviewing 
Pennsylvania’s SPAs, contacted DPW in November 2008 to 
clarify what effect the SPA would have on the federal dollars 
flowing to Pennsylvania.  In particular, Leuschner was 
concerned because the form DPW submitted with its SPA 
showed negative numbers in the “federal budget impact” box 
for fiscal years 2008 and 2009, which suggested “that 
nonpublic nursing facilities would be paid less [under the 
amended plan] than if the state continued using the existing 
payment methodology.”  (J.A. at 180.)  Leuschner asked 
DPW if that was the case, and the agency responded that the 
numbers on the form were actually incorrect, and “that 
                                              
 
11
  As discussed above, rates can still increase in 
absolute terms from year to year, even with the application of 
a BAF, because of the continuing use of the case-mix 
methodology.  The specific basis for the one percent increase 
in 2008-09 is not entirely clear, as the case-mix rates for the 
2007-08 fiscal year are not in the record.  What we do know 
is that: (1) the 2007-08 rates were calculated using the case-
mix methodology, and were then reduced by 6.806% (using 
the 2007-08 BAF); (2) the 2008-09 rates were calculated 
using the case-mix methodology, and were then reduced by 
9.109% (using the 2008-09 BAF); and (3) the 2008-09 rates 
resulted in payments that, overall, were one percent higher 
than in the previous year.  The increase therefore must have 
been due to some component of the case-mix formula, as the 
change in the BAF served only to reduce the case-mix rates 
by a larger amount.        
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nonpublic nursing homes were going to be paid more under 
the proposed rate methodology for state rate-setting year 
2008-2009 than they would have been paid if the existing rate 
structure were not changed.”  (J.A. at 180.)  To demonstrate 
that assertion, DPW provided a spreadsheet, which Leuschner 
understood to be comparing the rates for the 2008-09 fiscal 
year calculated “under Pennsylvania’s proposed 
methodology” with those “calculated in accordance with the 
methodology Pennsylvania had in place under the existing 
and (at that time approved) rate-setting method.”12  (J.A. at 
181.)  Leuschner “concluded that the total payments to 
private nursing homes were estimated to increase slightly 
during federal fiscal years 2008 and 2009 under the proposed 
SPAs,” and so “recommended proceeding with approval.”  
(J.A. at 182.)  CMS made a few “pen and ink” changes to the 
transmittal form to correct the federal budget impact numbers 
(J.A. at 221), and, on December 12, 2008, it approved the 
SPA.  In doing so, it specifically certified that the SPA 
conformed with the requirements of Section 13(A) and 
Section 30(A), and retroactively made the SPA’s effective 
date July 1, 2008.
13
     
                                              
12
 As discussed infra, Leuschner’s understanding does 
not appear to have been accurate, as he implies that the 2008-
09 rates would have been lower if the SPA were not 
approved.  That is incorrect, because if CMS did not 
authorize the use of a BAF for the 2008-09 fiscal year, as 
requested by SPA 08-007, then the per diem rates would not 
have been adjusted at all.  Leuschner was correct, however, 
that reimbursement rates would increase in absolute terms 
from 2007-08 to 2008-09.   
 
13
 Regulations permit CMS in some situations to make 
a plan amendment retroactively effective.  See 42 C.F.R. 
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 In March 2009, DPW published a final public notice 
announcing the finalized annual per diem payment rates, after 
the application of the BAF, for private nursing facilities for 
2008-09.  39 Pa. Bull. 1596 (Mar. 28, 2009).  It then sent 
letters to all participating nursing facilities to notify them of 
their final individualized rates.   
 
 B. Procedural History 
 
 Following DPW’s publication of the final payment 
rates, Plaintiffs filed timely state administrative appeals with 
DPW’s Bureau of Hearings and Appeals (the “BHA”) 
challenging those rates and asking that DPW “recalculate 
them consistent with [the] law.”  (Administrative Appeal, 
Doc. 20, Ex. A, at 14.)  See 55 Pa. Code §§ 41.5 (giving BHA 
“exclusive jurisdiction over provider appeals”) & 41.31 
(allowing “[a] provider that is aggrieved by an agency action” 
to “appeal and obtain review of that action by the [BHA] by 
filing a request for hearing”).  They claimed that DPW had 
violated the Medicaid Act and its own regulations by 
providing inadequate notice of and public process for the 
proposed rate changes, by retroactively setting the 2008-09 
rates, and by failing to provide CMS with any information on 
which that agency of the federal government could base its 
conclusion that SPA 08-007 satisfied Section 30(A)’s 
requirements.  In particular, Plaintiffs alleged that there was 
                                                                                                     
§§ 430.20(b)(2) & 447.256(c) (permitting a state plan 
amendment that changes the state’s payment methods and 
standards to become effective as early as “the first day of the 
calendar quarter in which an approvable amendment is 
submitted”). 
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no evidence of any consideration of the SPA’s effect on 
quality of care.     
 
 In October 2009, with those state administrative 
appeals pending, Plaintiffs filed the present action in the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania, bringing claims for declaratory and injunctive 
relief against the Secretary of HHS, the Administrator of 
CMS, and the Secretary of DPW.  Specifically, the complaint 
asserted a claim under the APA against the Federal 
Defendants, seeking to have HHS’s approval of SPA 08-007 
set aside as being contrary to law.  The complaint also 
included a claim under the Supremacy Clause against the 
State Defendant, seeking to bar the application of SPA 08-
007 in the determination of payment rates.  Those claims 
were primarily based on the Federal and State Defendants’ 
alleged violations of Section 30(A) and Section 13(A) in their 
development and approval of the 2008-09 state plan 
amendments.      
 
 Both the Federal and the State Defendants filed timely 
motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims.  The Federal 
Defendants argued that the APA claim was barred by 
sovereign immunity, but the District Court disagreed, 
concluding that the claim fell within the scope of the waiver 
of federal sovereign immunity provided for in the APA.
14
  It 
                                              
 
14
 The APA provides a waiver of federal sovereign 
immunity to people “adversely affected or aggrieved by 
agency action within the meaning of the relevant statute,” 5 
U.S.C. § 702, when the agency action is made reviewable by 
statute or there is a final agency action “for which there is no 
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therefore denied the Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss.  
The State Defendant’s motion raised three independent bases 
for dismissal: the abstention doctrine described in Younger v. 
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), mootness, and Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity.  The District Court granted 
the motion in part.  It abstained from deciding the Supremacy 
Clause claim insofar as it related to “conduct occurring prior 
to CMS approval of the proposed amendments[,]” as those 
issues could be adequately addressed in the ongoing state 
administrative proceeding.  Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. 
Sebelius, No. 1:09-cv-2007, at 19 (M.D. Pa. June 29, 2010) 
(slip op.).  It also dismissed the request for declaratory relief 
on immunity grounds, explaining that, if it “were to issue a 
declaratory decree to the effect that State Defendant’s 
implementation of the [SPA] violated federal law,” the decree 
could have res judicata effect in the state administrative 
appeals process, which “would leave to the state system ‘only 
a form of accounting proceeding whereby damages or 
restitution would be computed.’”  Id. at 25 (quoting Green v. 
Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 73 (1985)).)  The District Court held 
that the case was not moot, however, and it did not dismiss 
Plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief regarding the continuing 
application of the amended state plan.   
 
 The parties proceeded to discovery, and subsequently 
filed cross motions for summary judgment on the remaining 
claims.  The District Court granted the Federal and State 
Defendants’ motions on July 24, 2012,15 holding that, 
                                                                                                     
other adequate remedy,” id. § 704.  On appeal, the Federal 
Defendants do not contest that the waiver applies here.    
 
15
 The case was stayed from March 2011 until March 
2012 while the Supreme Court decided Douglas v. 
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“[g]iven [the] regulatory framework … and the deference 
afforded agency decision-making, … there is substantial 
evidence in the [administrative record] to support the 
Secretary’s approval of the SPAs under [S]ection 30(A).”  
Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 1:09-cv-2007, 
2012 WL 3027543, at *8 (M.D. Pa. July 24, 2012).  It further 
held that CMS could properly conclude that DPW had 
substantially complied with the public process requirements 
of Section 13(A).  Id. at *15.  The Court therefore found that 
HHS’s approval of SPA 08-007 was not arbitrary or 
capricious, and that the State Defendant’s implementation of 
the SPA was proper.  Id. at *16-*17.  Accordingly, it denied 
Plaintiffs’ motion and entered judgment for the Defendants.  
Id. at *17.  This timely appeal followed, in which Plaintiffs 
appeal both the grant of summary judgment and the earlier 
partial dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claim against the State 
Defendant.   
 
II. Discussion
16
 
 
 On appeal, Plaintiffs ask that we reverse the District 
Court’s orders and enter judgment in their favor on all counts.  
They repeat their contention that HHS’s approval of SPA 08-
                                                                                                     
Independent Living Center of Southern California, 132 S. Ct. 
1204 (2012), a case discussed infra that arose from 
California’s cuts to Medicaid reimbursement rates. 
 
16
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 and 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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007,
17
 as well as DPW’s implementation of it, violates federal 
law, specifically Sections 30(A) and 13(A) of the Medicaid 
Act.  They also argue that their claim against the State 
Defendant can be addressed in this proceeding and should be 
resolved in their favor.  This appeal therefore presents two 
distinct issues: first, whether the Federal Defendants’ 
approval of SPA 08-007 was proper under the APA, and, 
second, what relief, if any, Plaintiffs can obtain from the State 
Defendant in this suit. 
 
 A. APA Claim Against the Federal Defendants 
 
 Plaintiffs argue that HHS’s approval of SPA 08-007 
was improper for two reasons.
18
  First, they say that there was 
                                              
 
17
 For simplicity, we will generally refer to “HHS” or 
“the Secretary” when discussing the SPA approval process.  
We recognize that CMS conducted the approval process and 
exercised delegated authority in approving SPA 08-007.   
 
18
 Although SPA 08-007 only defined nursing 
facilities’ reimbursement rates for the 2008-09 fiscal year, no 
party contends that Plaintiffs’ challenge to HHS’s approval 
decision is moot.  Nonetheless, we have an independent 
obligation to determine whether Plaintiffs’ claim presents a 
justiciable case or controversy.  Rendell v. Rumsfeld, 484 F.3d 
236, 240 (3d Cir. 2007).  “[A] case will be considered moot, 
and therefore nonjusticiable as involving no case or 
controversy, if the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the 
parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.”  In 
re Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting In re 
Kulp Foundry, Inc., 691 F.2d 1125, 1128 (3d Cir. 1982)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  We conclude that 
Plaintiffs’ claim against the Federal Defendants is not moot.  
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insufficient evidence in the administrative record to support 
any conclusion that the SPA satisfies Section 30(A) of the 
Medicaid Act.  Discussed in more depth below, that provision 
requires that a state plan provide “methods and procedures” 
necessary to “assure” that payments to providers are 
“consistent with” efficiency, economy, quality of care, and 
adequate access to providers.  42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A).  
Plaintiffs note that SPA 08-007 categorically reduced – by 
more than nine percent – the per diem payments which are 
called for by the state’s own case-mix calculation, and which 
                                                                                                     
Although SPA 08-007 will not define their reimbursement 
rates in the future, nursing facilities continue to believe that 
the HHS’s decision to approve the SPA violated federal law, 
and that they are entitled to reimbursement rates for 2008-09 
that are calculated in accordance with a properly approved 
state plan.  This appeal provides an opportunity for them to 
obtain some measure of relief, since, if the agency’s action 
was arbitrary or capricious under the APA, we must set that 
action aside and require the agency to conform its action to 
federal law.  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (“The reviewing court 
shall … hold unlawful and set aside agency action … found 
to be … arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law … .”); see also Fla. 
Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985) 
(explaining that, “[i]f the record before the agency does not 
support the agency action, … the proper course, except in rare 
circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional 
investigation or explanation”).  Plaintiffs therefore have an 
interest in the outcome of this appeal “that is real and not 
hypothetical,” and their claim against the Federal Defendants 
provides an “occasion for meaningful relief.”  Rendell, 484 
F.3d at 240 (internal quotation marks omitted).                   
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are represented by the state as reflecting what is “necessary 
and reasonable for an efficiently and economically operated 
nursing facility to provide services to [Medicaid] residents.”  
55 Pa. Code § 1187.2.  They say that the arbitrary reduction 
imposed by the SPA threatens the quality of care provided to 
Medicaid recipients, yet the administrative record is “silent” 
as to the Defendants’ “consideration of the quality of care 
factor.”  (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 45.)  Therefore, they 
contend, HHS improperly concluded that the amended state 
plan satisfies Section 30(A).  Plaintiffs’ second contention is 
that HHS erred in concluding that DPW had satisfied the 
public process requirements of Section 13(A).  More 
particularly, they say that the only public notice published 
before the SPA’s effective date failed to comply with federal 
regulations regarding the content of such notices.   
 
 The District Court rejected both lines of argument.  
According significant deference to HHS’s interpretations of 
the Medicaid Act, the Court held that the record was 
sufficient to support the Secretary’s approval of the SPA.  
Christ the King Manor, 2012 WL 3027543, at *8-*9.  For the 
reasons elaborated herein, we disagree in part.  Although we 
agree with the District Court that we must defer to HHS’s 
reasonable interpretations of the Medicaid Act, and that DPW 
satisfied the public process requirements of Section 13(A), we 
part ways when it comes to the District Court’s decision that 
HHS could properly conclude on the evidence before it that 
SPA 08-007 complies with Section 30(A).  Our conclusion is, 
to the contrary, that HHS’s approval of the SPA was arbitrary 
and capricious, and must be set aside.  
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  1. Standard of Review 
 
 “We apply de novo review to a district court’s grant of 
summary judgment in a case brought under the APA, and in 
turn apply the applicable standard of review to the underlying 
agency decision.”  Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Sebelius, 674 
F.3d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Section 706 of the APA governs our review of the 
agency action.  CBS Corp. v. FCC, 663 F.3d 122, 137 (3d Cir. 
2011).  It provides that we shall “hold unlawful and set aside 
agency action, findings, and conclusions” that are “arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.”  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).  Under that 
restricted standard of review, we must consider whether the 
agency “examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a 
satisfactory explanation for its action,” while being careful 
“not to substitute [our own] judgment for that of the agency.”  
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); see also Prometheus 
Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(“[W]e must ensure that, in reaching its decision, the agency 
examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory 
explanation for its action, including a ‘rational connection 
between the facts found and the choice made.’” (quoting State 
Farm, 463 F.3d at 43)).  An agency action may be arbitrary 
and capricious “if the agency has relied on factors which 
Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to 
consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an 
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence 
before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be 
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency 
expertise.”  State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.   
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 In determining whether any of those circumstances 
exist, we are conscious of our responsibility to “uphold a 
decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may 
reasonably be discerned.”  Id. (quoting Bowman Transp. Inc. 
v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  Nevertheless, we should not 
“supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the 
agency itself has not given.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   Our review must also be based on “the 
administrative record [that was] already in existence” before 
the agency, not “some new record made initially in the 
reviewing court” or “post-hoc rationalizations” made after the 
disputed action.  Rite Aid of Pa., Inc. v. Houstoun, 171 F.3d 
842, 851 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
 The agency action at issue here is HHS’s approval of 
Pennsylvania’s SPA 08-007, which Plaintiffs argue was 
arbitrary and capricious because there was insufficient 
evidence in the administrative record that, as required by 
Section 30(A), DPW had considered the SPA’s impact on 
quality of care, or that it had followed the public process 
requirements of Section 13(A).  In so arguing, Plaintiffs 
implicitly take issue with HHS’s interpretation of the 
Medicaid Act.  By approving SPA 08-007, HHS evidently 
concluded that Pennsylvania’s amended state plan satisfies 
the requirements of Sections 30(A) and 13(A) of the Act.  See 
42 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1) (requiring the Secretary to “make a 
determination as to whether [the submitted plan] conforms to 
the requirements for approval”).  To reach that conclusion, 
the agency had to determine what those requirements entail, 
which involves interpreting the relevant provisions.  
Therefore, we must establish at the outset whether to accord 
Chevron deference to agency interpretations of the Medicaid 
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Act inherent in HHS approval of a state plan amendment.
19
  
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) (barring a court from 
“substitut[ing] its own construction of a statutory provision 
for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of 
an agency”).   
 
 Under the Supreme Court’s decision in United States 
v. Mead Corp., “administrative implementation of a particular 
statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it 
appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency 
generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the 
agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in 
the exercise of that authority.”  533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).  
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
recently explained, the Supreme Court “[a]rguably … has 
already concluded that SPA approvals meet” that standard, 
and thus are entitled to Chevron deference.  Managed 
Pharmacy Care v. Sebelius, 716 F.3d 1235, 1246 (9th Cir. 
2013).  In Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern 
California, Inc., the Supreme Court said that “[t]he Medicaid 
Act commits to the federal agency the power to administer a 
federal program,” and that, in approving a SPA, “the agency 
                                              
 
19
  We have previously held that Chevron deference 
applies to HHS’s interpretations of the Medicaid Act in the 
context of a challenge to a state plan amendment, but only in 
a case that was decided before the Supreme Court’s decision 
in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), which 
limited that deference to certain types of agency action.  See 
Erie Cnty. Geriatric Ctr. v. Sullivan, 952 F.2d 71, 77 (3d Cir. 
1991) (granting “substantial deference” to the Secretary’s 
interpretations of the Act).      
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has acted under [that] grant of authority.”  132 S. Ct. 1204, 
1210 (2012).  The Douglas Court noted that the agency’s 
approval “carries weight,” especially when “the language of 
the particular provision at issue … is broad and general, 
suggesting that the agency’s expertise is relevant in 
determining its application.”  Id.  Although the Court stopped 
short of explicitly holding that the Chevron framework 
applies to SPA approvals, those statements in dicta strongly 
suggest as much, and we “do not view them lightly.”  Galli v. 
N.J. Meadowlands Comm’n, 490 F.3d 265, 274 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. 
(“To ignore what we perceive as persuasive statements by the 
Supreme Court is to place our rulings … in peril.”).    
 
 In addition to that suggestion from the Supreme Court, 
some of our sister circuits have held that SPA approvals are 
the type of agency action entitled to Chevron deference under 
Mead, and no circuit court precedent holds to the contrary.  In 
Managed Pharmacy Care, for example, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that “Congress explicitly granted the Secretary 
authority to determine whether a State’s Medicaid plan 
complies with federal law,” and that “[i]t is well within the 
Secretary’s mandate to interpret the statute via case-by-case 
SPA adjudication.”  716 F.3d at 1249.  Similarly, the D.C. 
Circuit has held that, through express delegation of 
interpretive authority, “Congress manifested its intent that the 
Secretary’s determinations, based on interpretation of the 
relevant statutory provisions, should have the force of law.”  
Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Thompson, 362 F.3d 817, 
822 (D.C. Cir. 2004).  In short, the reasoning goes, the 
Chevron framework applies to SPA approvals.  Id. at 821; see 
also Managed Pharmacy Care, 716 F.3d at 1248 (“Chevron 
applies to SPA approvals … .”); Harris v. Olszewski, 442 
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F.3d 456, 467 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he agency’s approval of 
the state plan amendment is entitled to Chevron deference.”).   
 
 We agree.  The Medicaid Act expressly states that the 
Secretary must “approve any plan which fulfills the 
conditions specified” in the statute.  42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b).  
Through that provision, Congress delegated to the agency the 
responsibility to make interpretive decisions regarding which 
state plans satisfy the Act’s requirements.  Those decisions 
carry the force of law, as HHS is prohibited from making 
payments to states whose plans do not comply with the Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 1396c,
20
 and the state must pay for Medicaid 
services “using rates determined in accordance with methods 
and standards specified in an approved State plan,” 42 C.F.R. 
447.253(i).  See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X 
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980-81 (2005) (applying the 
Chevron framework because a statute gave an agency “the 
authority to promulgate binding legal rules” (citing Mead, 
533 U.S. at 231-34)).  SPA approvals are therefore the type of 
agency action that warrants Chevron deference under Mead.   
 
                                              
 
20
  Section 1396c was held unconstitutional in certain 
respects, not applicable here, in National Federation of 
Independent Businesses v. Sebelius.  132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 
(2012) (holding that HHS “cannot apply § 1396c to withdraw 
existing Medicaid funds for failure to comply with the 
requirements set out in the [Medicaid] expansion” provided 
for in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124 
Stat. 119).   
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 With that in mind, we turn to HHS’s approval of SPA 
08-007, given the strictures of Section 30(A) and Section 
13(A).     
 
   2. Compliance with Section 30(A) 
    
 Section 30(A) requires that a state Medicaid plan: 
 
provide such methods and procedures relating 
to the utilization of, and the payment for, care 
and services available under the plan … as may 
be necessary to safeguard against unnecessary 
utilization of such care and services and to 
assure that payments are consistent with 
efficiency, economy, and quality of care and are 
sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care 
and services are available under the plan at 
least to the extent that such care and services 
are available to the general population in the 
geographic area.   
 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (emphasis added).  Put more 
simply, it mandates that a state plan include “methods and 
procedures” that “assure that payments to providers produce 
four outcomes: (1) ‘efficiency,’ (2) ‘economy,’ (3) ‘quality of 
care,’ and (4) adequate access to providers by Medicaid 
beneficiaries.”  Pa. Pharmacists Ass’n, 283 F.3d at 537 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A)).  Section 30(A) is one 
of the statutory prerequisites a state plan must satisfy to 
receive federal approval, and thus federal funding.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (defining the requirements that a state plan 
“must” satisfy); id. § 1396a(b) (“The Secretary shall approve 
 30 
 
any plan which fulfills the conditions specified in subsection 
(a) of this section … .”).    
 
 We have considered Section 30(A)’s requirements on 
two previous occasions.  In Rite Aid of Pennsylvania v. 
Houstoun, we held that it mandates “substantive compliance” 
with the four specified factors, but it “does not impose any 
particular method or process for getting to that result.”  171 
F.3d at 851.  Rather, in contrast to an earlier and now-
repealed provision of the Medicaid Act known as the “Boren 
Amendment,” which “specifically requir[ed] that states take 
into account certain findings” and make particular 
assurances,
21
 Section 30(A) leaves it “up to a state how it will 
                                              
 
21
  The Boren Amendment required that a state pay 
providers using rates that “the State finds, and makes 
assurances satisfactory to the Secretary, are reasonable and 
adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred by 
efficiently and economically operated facilities in order to 
provide care and services in conformity with applicable State 
and Federal laws, regulations, and quality and safety 
standards … .”  42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1994).  The 
Boren Amendment was interpreted to impose both procedural 
and substantive requirements on states in setting 
reimbursement rates, and to be enforceable in a private right 
of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. 
Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 524 (1990) (“The Boren Amendment … 
creates a right, enforceable in a private cause of action 
pursuant to § 1983, to have the State adopt rates that it finds 
are reasonable and adequate rates to meet the costs of an 
efficient and economical health care provider.”).  The 
Amendment was repealed in 1997, after substantial lobbying 
 31 
 
‘assure’ the [required] outcomes.”  Id. at 852.  Nonetheless, 
we said that the state’s “process of decision-making” in 
setting a rate methodology must be “reasonable and sound,” 
id. at 853, and “budgetary considerations may not be the sole 
basis for a rate revision,” id. at 856.  In Pennsylvania 
Pharmacists Association v. Houstoun, we again interpreted 
Section 30(A), this time for the purpose of determining 
whether it granted Medicaid providers a cause of action under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.  283 F.3d at 534-35.  In holding that it does 
not, we explained that “Section 30(A), unlike the Boren 
Amendment, does not demand that payments be set at levels 
that are sufficient to cover provider costs,” but instead 
requires that they be “sufficient to meet recipients’ needs.”22  
Id. at 538.  Therefore, under this Court’s existing 
jurisprudence, Section 30(A) allows states to set a rate 
methodology using any process that is reasonable, considers 
more than simply budgetary factors, and results in payments 
that are sufficient to meet recipients’ needs. 
 
 But while those prior interpretations help guide our 
analysis, they do not necessarily control the outcome here.  
Under Chevron, if HHS applied a different but nonetheless 
permissible interpretation of Section 30(A), then we must 
                                                                                                     
efforts by states seeking greater latitude in setting their rates.  
Pa. Pharmacists Ass’n, 283 F.3d at 536, 539 & n.12.   
 
22
  Of course, the law of supply and demand does not 
disappear, no matter how much one might wish it would, so a 
focus on recipients that gives no thought to provider costs 
will soon leave ample demand from needy recipients and no 
providers to supply services.  Setting payment levels to meet 
recipients’ needs must therefore inevitably take into account 
provider costs.    
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defer to that interpretation, even if it conflicts with our 
precedent.  As the Supreme Court has made clear, a judicial 
precedent cannot displace a conflicting agency construction 
unless the statute “unambiguously forecloses the agency’s 
interpretation.”  See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982-83.  The 
question before us is therefore whether HHS’s approval of 
SPA 08-007 was based on a permissible construction of 
Section 30(A), not whether the SPA satisfies our prior 
interpretation of the statute.  Cf. Managed Pharmacy Care, 
716 F.3d at 1246-50 (deferring to HHS’s interpretation of 
Section 30(A) instead of applying the court’s prior 
interpretation of that provision).            
 
 To answer that question, we must consider the basis 
HHS had for concluding that Section 30(A) is satisfied, which 
requires that we examine the record it had before it during the 
SPA approval process.  Rite Aid, 171 F.3d at 851 (“[I]n 
reviewing section 30(A) issues a court must confine itself to 
the agency’s administrative record … .”).  That record is 
remarkably thin, especially when compared to the 
administrative records developed in other Section 30(A) 
challenges.  In Rite Aid, for example, the state amended 
reimbursement rates to pharmacies after conducting cost 
studies of pharmacy pricing data, considering input from 
interested parties, seeking additional data on the 
reimbursement rates of third-party payors, and comparing 
Pennsylvania’s rates to the rates in neighboring states.  Id. at 
848; see also, e.g., Long Term Care Pharmacy Alliance v. 
Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50, 52 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that the 
state agency revised rates after it “held hearings … and 
sought data from Massachusetts pharmacies as to their costs 
of acquisition of individual drugs”).  Here, on the other hand, 
there is no indication in the record as to how Pennsylvania 
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settled on the particular rate-calculation methodology 
proposed in SPA 08-007.  Although DPW explained that the 
2008-09 BAF was intended to limit payments to the amount 
appropriated by the state legislature, that explanation is the 
same as the one offered for BAFs overall.  It reveals nothing 
about how the particular BAF proposed in SPA 08-007 – 
which differed from the ones imposed in years past and 
required independent approval – was selected, other than that 
it was based on legislative appropriations for that fiscal year.  
Absent information on how the appropriated amount was 
determined, or a reasoned explanation for why that amount 
allows for rates that are “consistent with” efficiency, 
economy, quality of care, and adequate access, DPW’s 
description of the BAF methodology provides no insight into 
whether the SPA complies with Section 30(A).  The state 
gave no such information, and HHS did not request any.  
There are no studies or analyses of any kind in the record, and 
the only “data” DPW provided was a spreadsheet comparing 
rates under the proposed SPA with those paid the previous 
year.  HHS therefore had to base its approval decision solely 
on the proposed methodology itself, a comparison to the 
previous year’s rates, and DPW’s unsupported assertion that 
the new BAF would permit “payment rate increases sufficient 
to assure that consumers will continue to have access to 
medically necessary nursing facility services.”  (J.A. at 191.)    
 
 Notwithstanding the sparseness of the administrative 
record, the Federal Defendants argue that it supports the 
Secretary’s approval of SPA 08-007.  Specifically, they say 
that HHS could properly conclude that the SPA satisfies 
Section 30(A) for three reasons: first, payments to nursing 
facilities increased slightly from the previous fiscal year 
under the proposed SPA, second, Pennsylvania had 
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previously employed BAFs without harming quality of care, 
and, third, other statutory provisions independently assure 
that Medicaid recipients will receive quality care.   The 
Federal Defendants focus particularly on the overall increase 
in payments, emphasizing that “the budget adjustment factor 
did not cut payment rates in absolute terms, but rather served 
to moderate the rate of increase in provider payments under 
the case-mix system and thereby avoid an unsustainable pace 
of inflation.”  (U.S. Br. at 19.) 
 
 But while that assertion is undisputed, and reducing 
unsustainable inflation is certainly a laudable and entirely 
legitimate state objective, the small absolute increase in 
payments from 2007 to 2008 reveals practically nothing about 
SPA 08-007’s compliance with Section 30(A).  As the 
Federal Defendants acknowledge, that increase is due to the 
application of the case-mix methodology, which has been in 
place since 1996.  An essential premise of their argument 
seems to be that the case-mix method results in payments that 
are unduly high, and that do not in fact reflect the “necessary” 
costs of providing care to Medicaid recipients.  That may be 
the case, but there is no evidence of it anywhere in the record, 
and DPW never suggests that the state’s underlying 
methodology is flawed.  Rather, the state repeatedly explains 
that it must reduce the case-mix rates for budgetary reasons, 
not because they are based on a rate-calculation methodology 
that overcompensates providers.   
 
 The case-mix method sets per diem rates for each 
nursing facility by considering, among other things, the 
projected acuity level of Medicaid recipients and the costs 
“which are necessary and reasonable for an efficiently and 
economically operated nursing facility to provide services” to 
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those patients.  55 Pa. Code § 1187.2.  In other words, it 
determines payments by considering the costs of providing 
care to Medicaid recipients, which means that the increase in 
payment rates is due, at least in part, to increasing costs.  The 
contested SPA does not change that aspect of the rate 
calculation methodology; it just adds one last step: using a 
BAF to reduce the final per diem rates.  The overall increase 
in payments therefore tells us nothing about the SPA’s effect 
on quality of care; it just shows that the cost of caring for 
Medicaid recipients – as determined under the case-mix 
methodology – continues to go up.   
 
 To demonstrate that point, we need only look to 
DPW’s proposed rate revisions for 2005.  The BAF initially 
proposed for the 2005-06 fiscal year would have allowed 
rates to increase two percent from the previous year – twice 
the increase allowed by the 2008-09 BAF.  After interested 
parties raised numerous criticisms about the proposed change, 
the legislature appropriated additional funds and the BAF was 
revised to allow for a 2.8% increase in rates.  35 Pa. Bull. 
6233 (Nov. 12, 2005).  DPW explained that the adjustment in 
the cap addressed quality of care concerns, and thus DPW 
effectively acknowledged that rates can increase in absolute 
terms while still being inadequate to meet recipients’ needs.  
Id. at 6233-34.   
 
 In reviewing SPA 08-007, however, HHS not only 
treated the absolute increase as sufficient assurance of quality 
of care; it also seemed to misunderstand the SPA’s effect on 
Pennsylvania’s rate calculation methodology.  Based on a 
spreadsheet showing the one percent increase in payments 
from the previous year, the CMS employee responsible for 
reviewing the SPA concluded that rates would be higher 
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under the SPA than they would have been “if the existing rate 
structure were not changed,” in effect concluding that the 
SPA was responsible for the rate increase.  (J.A. at 180.)  But 
that cannot be the case, as the only change proposed in the 
SPA was the use of a BAF that more substantially reduced the 
case-mix rates than in any previous year.  See supra note 12.  
Moreover, under the previously approved state plan, BAFs 
were authorized only through 2008, meaning that the 
approved rate-calculation method did not involve the use of 
any BAF for the 2008-09 fiscal year.  Rates were therefore 
projected to increase in 2008-09 despite the proposed SPA, 
not because of it.    
 
 Pennsylvania’s previous use of BAFs also provides no 
assurance that payments under SPA 08-007 would be 
consistent with quality of care.  According to the Federal 
Defendants, because Pennsylvania had “already employed a 
budget adjustment factor in three previous fiscal years” (U.S. 
Br. at 19) without causing “any apparent issues with quality 
of care or beneficiary access to services” (id. at 20), HHS 
could reasonably conclude that SPA 08-007 “was likewise 
compliant with Section 30(A)” (id.).  They emphasize that, 
even with ongoing monitoring activities, HHS had not been 
made “aware of any complaints by beneficiaries or nursing 
facilities … about payments made pursuant to the BAF 
system.”  (Id.)  They further note that federal regulations 
permit HHS to approve a state plan amendment “on the basis 
of policy statements and precedents previously approved” by 
the agency.  42 C.F.R. § 430.15(b).  Therefore, they argue, 
HHS could reasonably conclude that the proposed 
amendment, which “employed a substantially similar 
methodology” to the one taken the previous three years, “was 
likewise compliant with Section 30(A).”  (U.S. Br. at 20.)    
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 The obvious flaw in that argument is that earlier 
adjustments do not reveal how a later and different 
adjustment may change a system already affected by the 
earlier adjustments.  The fifth blow to a boxer’s chin may be 
no more forceful than the previous four, but still be forceful 
enough to shatter a weakened jaw.  And if the fifth blow is 
more forceful, a “no worries” mindset is even less warranted.  
The 2008-09 fiscal year’s adjustment of 9.109% is not 
necessarily the same in its impact as the 6.806% adjustment 
that was proposed for 2007-08.   
 
 The Federal Defendants portray the continued use of 
BAFs generally as the key change proposed by SPA 08-007, 
and they treat BAFs as simply another variable in the case-
mix methodology.  Just as provider costs and resident acuity 
vary year to year under the approved rate-calculation formula, 
so too does the BAF, they imply.  But a BAF is not simply a 
variable in an approved formula; each new BAF effectively 
establishes a new formula by which final rates are calculated, 
and hence is a “[m]aterial change[]” to the state’s plan that 
requires its own approval.  See 42 C.F.R. § 430.12(c)(1)(ii) 
(requiring a state to amend its plan when necessary to reflect 
“[m]aterial changes … in the State’s operation of the 
Medicaid program”).  Depending on what the state legislature 
decides, a BAF could cut per diem rates by less than five 
percent, as it did in 2005, or by nine percent, as SPA 08-007 
proposed, or potentially by even more.  Yet under the Federal 
Defendants’ reasoning, the use of any BAF, regardless of its 
size, could be justified by the fact that a previous, smaller 
adjustment to the cost-based rate proved acceptable. That 
conclusion is unsupported and unsupportable.  A BAF is – at 
base – simply a budget-based cut to provider payments, and 
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the size of that cut matters to Medicaid recipients and 
providers.  Although it may be possible to decrease payments 
by nine percent, as SPA 08-007 does, and not affect quality of 
care, it is also very possible that care will be significantly and 
negatively affected, and the success of earlier cuts does not 
suggest otherwise.  It is simply not reasonable to conclude 
that, because prior cuts did not seem too painful, a deeper cut 
would not hurt.  
 
 That leaves “independent statutory assurances” as the 
only basis, beyond DPW’s bare assertion that consumers will 
still have access to Medicaid services, upon which HHS could 
conclude that the rate-calculation methodology of SPA 08-
007 will produce payments that are consistent with quality of 
care.  It is true, as the Federal Defendants note, that we have 
previously considered it reasonable for a state “to rely upon 
laws or regulations which independently ensure quality care” 
when setting payment rates under Section 30(A).  Rite Aid, 
171 F.3d at 855.  Seizing upon that statement, the Federal 
Defendants describe provisions of the Nursing Home Reform 
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3, 1396, that allow for “oversight 
and inspection of nursing facilities” and “require[] 
certification that participating facilities satisfy certain ‘quality 
of care’ standards.”  (U.S. Br. at 21 (citing those provisions).)  
They also note that in 2005 Pennsylvania instructed nursing 
facilities that they have an obligation “to provide appropriate, 
high-quality care” that “exists independent of any particular 
payment rate or any features of the rate-setting methodology.”  
(Id. (quoting 35 Pa. Bull. 6232 (Nov. 12, 2005)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).)  Based on our holding in Rite Aid, 
the Federal Defendants contend that HHS could have 
reasonably relied upon such “independent assurances of 
quality of care” when it approved SPA 08-007. 
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 Those assurances cannot be the sole basis for a rate 
revision, however, or Section 30(A)’s quality of care 
component – and HHS’s review of that component – would 
be rendered meaningless.  In Rite Aid, independent statutory 
assurances were but one feature of an ample record.  See 171 
F.3d at 848 (describing the studies conducted).  We never 
suggested that, as long as states declare their insistence on 
quality care under other statutory provisions, reimbursement 
rates will be deemed to satisfy Section 30(A).  Such an 
interpretation of Section 30(A) not only defies its plain 
language and nullifies HHS’s review process under that 
provision, see Erie Cnty. Geriatic Ctr. v. Sullivan, 952 F.2d 
71, 78 (3d Cir. 1991) (declining to interpret the Medicaid Act 
in a manner that renders HHS review “hardly more than 
ministerial”), it also ignores fiscal realities by implying that a 
state can continue to assure quality of care by holding nursing 
homes to high standards while simultaneously underfunding 
them.  In short, simply passing a statute saying that nursing 
homes will provide quality care does not make it so.  Section 
30(A) cannot reasonably be interpreted to mean that once a 
state has declared its commitment to quality of care, it need 
not consider that factor in setting its reimbursement rates.  
 
 Nor is a state’s unsupported assertion that its plan 
meets Section 30(A)’s requirements, without any 
accompanying explanation or evidence, a sufficient basis to 
support HHS approval.  In approving a state plan, HHS must 
be able to conclude that the plan “provide[s] such methods 
and procedures … as may be necessary … to assure that 
payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and 
quality of care.”  42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A).  It is true that 
Section 30(A) grants states considerable latitude in selecting a 
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method for calculating reimbursement rates, and that it “does 
not impose any particular method or process” for meeting its 
substantive requirements.  Rite Aid, 171 F.3d at 851.  But that 
latitude is not limitless.  The reimbursement rates that states 
select affect the funding they are entitled to receive from the 
federal government, and material changes to those rates are 
thus subject to federal approval.  Section 30(A) gives teeth to 
the approval process, allowing HHS to reject state plans that 
provide inadequate assurance that payments will be consistent 
with efficiency, economy, quality of care, and adequate 
access.  See 42 C.F.R. § 430.15(c)(1) (providing that CMS, 
with HHS’s approval, “retains authority for determining that 
proposed plan material is not approvable or that previously 
approved material no longer meets the requirements for 
approval”).  And HHS has done so before, denying approval 
to state plan amendments when states “provide[] no … data to 
substantiate [their] proposed rates,” Alaska Dep’t of Health & 
Soc. Servs. v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 424 F.3d 
931, 937 (9th Cir. 2005), or when they provide “unsupported 
assertions” of compliance with Section 30(A), Minnesota v. 
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 495 F.3d 991, 996 (8th 
Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
 If we were to hold that DPW’s bare assertion is 
sufficient to satisfy Section 30(A), we would make that 
provision a dead letter.  The Medicaid Act requires that HHS 
“approve any plan which fulfills the conditions” imposed on 
state plans.  42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b).  Therefore, in order for 
HHS to deny approval on Section 30(A) grounds, a plan must 
fail to fulfill its conditions.  If a state could satisfy those 
conditions simply by asserting that it has done so, then HHS 
would lack the authority to disapprove a plan due to a state’s 
lack of data or its “unsupported assertions.”  No court has 
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countenanced such an impotence-inducing interpretation of 
Section 30(A).  On the contrary, in holding that Section 30(A) 
confers no private right of action against the state under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, courts have repeatedly assured Medicaid 
providers and recipients that the quality of care and access 
requirements will not “go unenforced” because “HHS [is] 
responsible for ensuring that state plans are administered in 
accordance with these requirements.”  Pa. Pharmacists Ass’n, 
283 F.3d at 543-44; see also Long Term Care Pharm. 
Alliance v. Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50, 56 (1st Cir. 2004) (“Of 
course, the Secretary of HHS … can enforce compliance with 
[Section 30(A)] and implementing regulations … by 
disapproving a state plan … .”).  There is no suggestion in the 
text, its accompanying regulations, or the legislative history 
that HHS’s oversight role in enforcing Section 30(A)’s 
requirements involves simply accepting a state’s assertions at 
face value.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b) (requiring the Secretary 
to approve plans that “fulfill[] the conditions specified in 
subsection (a),” which include Section 30(A)); 42 C.F.R. 
§ 430.12(c) (requiring “[p]rompt submittal of amendments … 
[s]o that CMS can determine whether the plan continues to 
meet the requirements for approval”); 146 Cong. Rec. 
H11682-02 (explaining that, even with the repeal of the 
Boren Amendment, the Medicaid Act ensures through 
Section 30(A) that states “provide adequate reimbursement”).  
Therefore, to the extent that HHS’s approval of a SPA rests 
on such an interpretation, it is not a “permissible construction 
of the statute” entitled to deference under Chevron.  467 U.S. 
at 842-43.
23
     
                                              
 
23
  Before the District Court, the Federal Defendants 
argued that HHS “was required to more rigorously scrutinize 
a proposed amendment only when [the state’s] assurances 
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were questionable on their face.”  Christ the King Manor, 
2012 WL 3027543, at *6.  Although the Federal Defendants 
do not repeat that argument on appeal, we take a moment to 
address it here, as the District Court seems to have found it 
convincing.  See id. at *8-*9 (agreeing with the Federal 
Defendants’ interpretation of the state’s obligations under 
Section 30(A)); see also id. at *14 (concluding that “it was 
within CMS’s expertise to determine whether DPW’s 
representations concerning approval of the SPAs, which 
mirrored those approved in the past, complied with section 
30(A)”).  HHS may choose not to exercise the same rigor in 
scrutinizing all state plan amendments.  But it must actually 
scrutinize them, at least to the extent necessary to “make a 
determination as to whether [the amendment] conforms to the 
requirements for approval.”  42 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1).  
Furthermore, we reject the notion that, as a threshold matter, 
we must determine whether a SPA is facially questionable 
before reviewing the agency’s action.  Such an approach 
would require a reviewing court to make its own assessment 
of whether a proposed change should have raised red flags 
regarding quality of care, a task which is for HHS and which 
we are ill-equipped to perform.  Here, for example, the 
Federal Defendants indicate that a 9.109% reduction is 
nothing to worry about, but, absent information justifying that 
assertion, a court has no way to know if such a reduction 
should have caused HHS to take a closer look.  The BAF 
proposed in SPA 08-007 could have reduced rates by 5%, 
10%, 15%, or something even greater, and presumably the 
Federal Defendants would agree that, at some point, it would 
be arbitrary and capricious for HHS to approve the SPA 
based solely on soothing words from the state.  For that 
reason, the burden is on the agency, not on the reviewing 
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 Of course, as the Federal Defendants rightly note, 
there is a bit more in the record in this case than the state’s 
assertion that SPA 08-007 would “still provid[e] payment rate 
increases sufficient to assure that consumers will continue to 
have access to medically necessary nursing facility services.”  
(J.A. at 191.)  There is also “data,” in the form of the 
spreadsheet DPW submitted at HHS’s request, “showing that 
payments to nonpublic nursing facilities would increase” 
from the prior fiscal year.  (U.S. Br. at 23.)  But, as described 
above, that increase does not, by itself, tell us or HHS 
anything about the SPA’s effect on quality of care or access 
to providers.
24
  So far as the record shows, Pennsylvania 
decided to reduce its cost-based per diem rates to the amount 
that it could afford to pay, without taking any steps to ensure 
that payments would still be consistent with quality of care 
and adequate access.  In approving that decision, HHS seems 
to have “entirely failed to consider” those “important 
                                                                                                     
court, to supply a reasoned basis for its action.  See State 
Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.                   
 
24
   Although Plaintiffs focus their argument on the 
“quality of care” factor, we note that “quality of care” and 
“adequate access to providers” are related concepts, and that 
budget cuts have the capacity to affect both components of 
Section 30(A).  If, for example, a state reduces its payments 
to significantly below the amount necessary for a nursing 
facility to treat its patients, some facilities might cut corners 
and provide inadequate care, whereas others might stop 
accepting Medicaid patients altogether and thus restrict access 
to providers.  See Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 
1491, 1498 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing the possible effects of 
payment reductions on access to providers). 
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aspect[s]” of Section 30(A).  See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.  
Indeed, the record suggests that the agency misunderstood the 
proposed changes and blessed the SPA based solely on the 
absolute increase in payments from the previous year.  There 
is no indication that the agency “examine[d] the relevant 
data,” nor did it “articulate a satisfactory explanation for its 
action.”  Id.  Therefore, because we cannot discern from the 
record a reasoned basis for the agency’s decision, we 
conclude that its approval of SPA 08-007 was arbitrary and 
capricious under the APA. 
 
 In so holding, we do not imply that the payments 
Pennsylvania made to providers during the 2008-09 fiscal 
year were in fact inconsistent with any of Section 30(A)’s 
requirements.  It is possible that the state was able to adjust 
the per diem rates by nine percent while maintaining quality 
care and ensuring adequate access to providers.  But it is also 
possible that the state’s nine percent adjustment threatened to 
harm care to Medicaid recipients in ways that previous, 
smaller adjustments had not.  The problem here is that, at 
least so far as the record shows, HHS did not actually 
determine which scenario it confronted, and thus we are 
obligated to set its approval decision aside.  5 U.S.C. § 706(2) 
(requiring courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency 
action … found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”).25        
                                              
 
25
 That does not mean that Plaintiffs will necessarily be 
entitled to a rate recalculation, and we in no way suggest that 
they should have been paid in accordance with the previously 
approved state plan, which did not involve the use of any 
BAF for the 2008-09 fiscal year.  When, as here, “the record 
before the agency does not support the agency action,” the 
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   3. Compliance with Section 13(A) 
 
 Plaintiffs also contend that HHS’s approval of SPA 
08-007 was arbitrary and capricious because the state failed to 
comply with the public process requirements of Section 
13(A) and its accompanying regulations.  They say that, 
although DPW provided numerous public notices of its 
proposed changes, only the June Notice was published before 
the SPA’s effective date, and it inadequately described the 
new rate methodology and did not include certain details 
required by federal regulations.  Specifically, they complain 
that the Notice was published only two days before the SPA’s 
proposed effective date, did not include the specific BAF 
ultimately adopted, failed to provide an estimate of the 
expected increase or decrease in aggregate expenditures, and 
did not identify any local agencies where copies of the 
proposed changes would be available for public review.  
Because of those alleged deficiencies, they argue that HHS 
could not have lawfully accepted DPW’s assurance that 
Pennsylvania had “provided advance notice of its intent to 
amend its State Plan.”  (J.A. at 192.)  
 
                                                                                                     
agency may be afforded an opportunity “for additional 
investigation or explanation,” upon which the agency could 
lawfully base its action.  Fla. Power & Light Co., 470 U.S. at 
744.  Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(4) (providing that, when a court 
of appeals reviews a state’s appeal of an agency decision 
regarding a state plan, the court “may remand the case to the 
Secretary to take further evidence, and [she] may thereupon 
make new or modified findings of fact and may modify [her] 
previous action”).         
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 Section 13(A) of the Medicaid Act requires that states 
seeking to change their rate-setting methodologies provide a 
public process under which: 
 
(i) proposed rates, the methodologies 
underlying the establishment of such rates, and 
justifications for the proposed rates are 
published, 
 
(ii) providers, beneficiaries and their 
representatives, and other concerned State 
residents are given a reasonable opportunity for 
review and comment on the proposed rates, 
methodologies, and justifications, [and] 
 
(iii) final rates, the methodologies underlying 
the establishment of such rates, and 
justifications for such final rates are published 
… . 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A).  In other words, a state must 
provide notice of “proposed rates together with the 
methodologies and justifications used to establish those 
rates,” and give “concerned state residents … a reasonable 
opportunity” to review and comment on them.  Children’s 
Seashore House v. Waldman, 197 F.3d 654, 659 (3d Cir. 
1999).  Federal regulations provide further guidance on the 
substantive requirements of that notice.  Under 42 C.F.R. 
§ 447.205, notice of a “significant proposed change” in a 
state’s rate-setting methodology must “[d]escribe the 
proposed change in methods and standards,” “[g]ive an 
estimate of any expected increase or decrease in annual 
aggregate expenditures,” “[e]xplain why the agency is 
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changing its methods and standards,” and “[i]dentify a local 
agency … where copies of the proposed changes are available 
for public review.”  42 C.F.R. § 447.205(a), (c).  Section 
447.205 also provides that the notice must “[b]e published 
before the proposed effective date of the change.”  Id. 
§ 447.205(d)(1).  Those notice requirements must be satisfied 
in order for a state plan amendment to receive approval.  Id. 
§ 447.253(h).   
 
 Our review of the state’s compliance with Section 
13(A) is circumscribed by HHS’s decision to approve the 
SPA.  As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “[o]ur duty is not to 
determine for ourselves whether the State’s notice sufficiently 
complied with the statute and regulations; that duty is 
imposed on the Secretary.”  Indep. Acceptance Co. v. 
California, 204 F.3d 1247, 1251-52 (9th Cir. 2000).  We must 
instead consider, as we did with Section 30(A), “whether the 
Secretary acted arbitrarily or capriciously when she accepted 
the State’s assurance of notice as satisfactory to her.”  Id. at 
1252.  In doing so, we accord deference to the Secretary’s 
reasonable interpretations of Section 13(A), see supra Section 
II.A.1, and we must give controlling weight to her 
interpretations of her own regulations unless they are 
inconsistent with the regulation or plainly erroneous.  Thomas 
Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994).       
 
 Under that standard, we cannot say that it was arbitrary 
or capricious for HHS to accept DPW’s assurance that it had 
provided adequate notice of the proposed changes to its rate-
calculation methodology.  Section 13(A) speaks very 
generally, requiring simply that the state provide notice and a 
“reasonable opportunity” for comment on proposed rate 
revisions.  42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A).  The June Notice did 
 48 
 
so, as it put providers and beneficiaries on notice of the 
estimated BAF for 2008-09, informed them as to how and 
why the BAF would be determined, and provided thirty days 
for submission of comments.  See Evergreen Presbyterian 
Ministries, Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d 908, 920 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that a state satisfied Section 13(A)’s notice 
requirements because its notices “outlined the substance of 
the plan in sufficient detail to allow interested parties to 
decide how and whether to seek more information on the 
plan’s particular aspects” (internal quotation marks omitted)), 
abrogation on other grounds recognized by Equal Access for 
El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697, 704 (5th Cir. 2007).  
Although the Notice was published just days before the 
SPA’s requested effective date of July 1, 2008, the new rates 
were not actually implemented on that date; rather the SPA 
was made retroactively effective when it was approved in 
December 2008.  Interested parties therefore had ample 
opportunity to review and comment on the proposed changes 
before they were finalized.
26
  Furthermore, although the BAF 
described in the June Notice differed slightly from the one 
submitted in the SPA, the revised BAF was, on its face, more 
favorable to nursing facilities.  HHS could therefore have 
reasonably concluded that the June Notice “outlined the 
substance” of the new rate calculation methodology “in 
sufficient detail” to alert nursing facilities to the scope and 
nature of the proposed change.  Evergreen, 235 F.3d at 920.      
 
 That DPW may have failed to literally comply with 
federal regulations regarding public notice does not make 
                                              
 
26
 Notably, Plaintiffs do not contend that they lacked 
actual notice of the proposed changes, or that they were 
denied adequate opportunity to comment on the new BAF. 
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HHS’s acceptance of its assurances arbitrary or capricious.  
According to Plaintiffs, the June Notice violated 42 C.F.R. 
§ 447.205(c) by not providing a numeric estimate of the 
“expected increase or decrease in annual aggregate 
expenditures,” and by not identifying any county offices 
where copies of the Notice would be available for public 
review.  (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 59.)  Plaintiffs do not 
dispute, however, that the estimated BAF included in the 
Notice revealed the percentage by which rates would be 
adjusted, which HHS could reasonably have found to be an 
acceptable substitute to a dollar estimate of the state’s 
aggregate expenditures.  See Evergreen, 235 F.3d at 921 
(permitting “the use of a percentage, rather than a dollar 
figure” in a state’s notice of a proposed amendment).   
 
 Plaintiffs also do not contend that the June Notice was 
unavailable for public review – they just say it was not made 
available in the precise manner provided for in the regulation.  
But again, it is within the Secretary’s discretion to consider 
publication in the Pennsylvania Bulletin the effective 
equivalent of distributing a notice to county offices.  In any 
event, based on the record before it, HHS could readily 
conclude that Pennsylvania had “substantial[ly] compli[ed]” 
with federal notice requirements, which is all that is necessary 
for the Secretary to reasonably accept a state’s assurances to 
that effect.  Indep. Acceptance Co., 204 F.3d at 1252 (holding 
that “in accepting the State’s assurance, the Secretary was not 
required to hold the State to absolutely literal compliance 
with the notice requirements,” but rather “had discretion to 
determine whether the State had given sufficient assurance 
that its notice was in substantial compliance”); see also 
Oklahoma v. Shalala, 42 F.3d 595, 603 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(deferring to CMS’s decision to “relax[] the notice 
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requirement from full formal compliance to ‘at least minimal 
compliance’ through publication of ‘an appropriate public 
notice before the effective date of the proposed change’”).      
 
 We therefore agree with the District Court that HHS 
was neither arbitrary nor capricious in accepting DPW’s 
assurance that the state had satisfied Section 13(A)’s public 
process requirements.  That does not mean that Plaintiffs’ 
dissatisfaction with the process at issue here is unreasonable.  
Their fundamental complaint – that DPW published an 
incomplete notice two days before the proposed effective date 
of a major change to the administration of its Medicaid 
program – is an accurate description of the state’s actions.  
But HHS accepted those actions as being sufficiently 
compliant with federal law, and, particularly in light of the 
actual time the public had to consider the proposed change, 
we cannot say that the agency’s conclusion was arbitrary or 
capricious on this record.   
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 B. Supremacy Clause Claim Against the State  
  Defendant
27
 
 
 In addition to their claim against the Federal 
Defendants, Plaintiffs also seek declaratory and injunctive 
relief against the Secretary of DPW.  The underlying 
substance of that claim is virtually identical to Plaintiffs’ 
complaint against the Federal Defendants – they say that the 
rate revisions adopted by SPA 08-007 violate Section 30(A) 
and Section 13(A) of the Medicaid Act, and are thus 
preempted by federal law.  Plaintiffs ask that we therefore 
enjoin the “continuing application” of the SPA (J.A. at 111), 
and that we require DPW to pay nursing facilities “using rates 
determined in accordance with the methods and standards 
                                              
27
 We note at the outset that it is questionable whether 
Plaintiffs can sustain a cause of action under the Supremacy 
Clause at all.  In Douglas v. Independent Living Center, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari “to decide whether 
Medicaid providers and recipients may maintain a cause of 
action under the Supremacy Clause to enforce a federal 
Medicaid law.”  132 S. Ct. at 1207.  The Court declined to 
answer that question, however, instead concluding that 
federal approval of the contested state plan put the case “in a 
different posture” and remanding the case to the court of 
appeals.  Id. at 1210.  Therefore, although the dissent strongly 
suggested that the Supremacy Clause does not provide a 
cause of action when Congress has declined to provide one, 
id. at 1211, the Court’s previous decision in Shaw v. Delta Air 
Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.14 (1983), which recognized a 
private right of action under the Supremacy Clause, remains 
binding on us.  Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325, 346 n.20 
(3d Cir. 2012).    
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specified in the [state plan] in effect prior to changes 
contained in the vacated amendments” (J.A. at 140).   
 
The District Court rejected Plaintiffs’ claim for several 
reasons.  First, invoking Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 
(1971), it abstained from deciding the claim to the extent it 
challenged state conduct that occurred before federal approval 
of the SPA.  The Court also denied all declaratory relief, 
concluding that such relief was barred by Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity.  That left only Plaintiffs’ 
request for an injunction, which the Court allowed to proceed 
to discovery.  The District Court subsequently entered 
summary judgment in favor of the State Defendant on that 
claim because of its conclusion “that the Federal Defendants’ 
approval of the SPAs was not arbitrary or capricious under 
the APA.”  Christ the King Manor, 2012 WL 3027543, at 
*17.  Although we have now decided that that conclusion was 
in error, we will nonetheless affirm the District Court’s grant 
of summary judgment to the State Defendant on the basis that 
the Eleventh Amendment deprives us of jurisdiction to grant 
the requested relief.
28
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  “We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
grant of summary judgment,” and we will affirm only if 
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Mabey 
Bridge & Shore, Inc. v. Schoch, 666 F.3d 862, 867 (3d Cir. 
2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “Dismissal of an 
action based upon sovereign immunity is subject to plenary 
review by this Court.”  Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 
77 F.3d 690, 694 (3d Cir. 1996).  
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  The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution 
provides that: 
 
The Judicial power of the United States shall 
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or 
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of 
the United States by Citizens of another State, 
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. 
 
U.S. Const. amend. XI.  The Supreme Court has made clear 
that, under that Amendment, “an unconsenting State is 
immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own 
citizens as well as by citizens of another State.”  Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 
134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890)).  Therefore, unless Congress has 
“specifically abrogated” the states’ sovereign immunity or a 
state has unequivocally consented to suit in federal court, we 
lack jurisdiction to grant relief in such cases.  Blanciak v. 
Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 694 (3d Cir. 1996); id. 
at 694 n. 2 (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional 
bar which deprives federal courts of subject matter 
jurisdiction.”).  
 
 Suits against state officials are a different matter, 
however.  Based on its landmark holding in Ex parte Young, 
209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Supreme Court has permitted suits 
against state officials that seek prospective relief to end an 
ongoing violation of federal law.  Pa. Fed’n of Sportsmen’s 
Clubs, Inc. v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2002).  The 
theory behind Young is that a state officer lacks the authority 
to enforce an unconstitutional state enactment, and thus the 
officer is “stripped of his official or representative character 
and becomes subject to the consequences of his individual 
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conduct.”  Id. (quoting MCI Telecomm. Corp v. Bell Atl. Pa., 
271 F.3d 491, 506 (3d Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Plaintiffs can therefore bring suit against state 
officers, but their remedies are limited to those that are 
“designed to end a continuing violation of federal law.”  
Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985).  Plaintiffs may not 
be awarded damages or other forms of retroactive relief.  
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 
103 (1984). 
 
That bar on retroactive relief includes forms of 
equitable relief that are functionally equivalent to damage 
awards.  Green, 474 U.S. at 69-70 (citing Edelman, 415 U.S. 
at 666-69).   As we explained in Blanciak v. Allegheny 
Ludlum Corp., “relief that essentially serves to compensate a 
party injured in the past by the action of a state official, even 
though styled as something else, is barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment.”  77 F.3d at 697-98 (citing Green, 474 U.S. at 
68; Edelman, 415 U.S. at 664-68).  We contrasted such relief 
with remedies that may have “a substantial ancillary effect on 
the state treasury,” but primarily serve “to bring an end to a 
present, continuing violation of federal law.”  Id. at 698 
(quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 (1986)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The label given to the 
requested relief is “of no importance” – we must “look to the 
substance rather than the form of the relief requested” to 
determine if it is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.  Id.  
When an action “is in essence one for the recovery of money 
from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest 
and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit 
even though individual officers are nominal defendants.”  
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663 (quoting Ford Motor Corp. v. 
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Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 
 Under that standard, the remedies Plaintiffs seek 
against the State Defendant cannot properly be characterized 
as claims for prospective relief “designed to end a continuing 
violation of federal law.”  Green, 474 U.S. at 68.  Plaintiffs 
challenge the Secretary of DPW’s development and 
application of SPA 08-007, which, as already extensively 
discussed, used a BAF to adjust reimbursement rates for the 
2008-09 fiscal year.
29
  That SPA has not been in effect since 
July 1, 2009, and Plaintiffs do not claim that Pennsylvania’s 
current rate-calculation methodology violates federal law.  
More to the point, they do not identify any ongoing conduct 
by the Secretary of DPW that must be enjoined to ensure the 
supremacy of federal law.  Instead, they challenge the rates 
DPW paid five years ago, and they argue that they are entitled 
to “prospective corrective payments” from the state.  
                                              
29
 The District Court construed Plaintiffs’ claim more 
broadly, saying that it challenged not only SPA 08-007, but 
also “the underlying methodology” contained in the SPA – 
that is, the use of budget-based adjustments generally.  That 
construction is too generous.  Plaintiffs’ complaint is quite 
specific in stating that it challenges SPA 08-007 and SPA 08-
008 (which, as discussed supra note 8, is no longer at issue).  
Moreover, all of the factual allegations in the complaint focus 
on the state’s adoption and implementation of SPA 08-007, 
and key to Plaintiffs’ argument is that the BAF in that SPA 
was more damaging than in previous years.  We therefore 
construe Plaintiffs’ complaint as a challenge to the particular 
rates calculated using SPA 08-007, not as a generalized 
challenge to the use of a budget adjustment factor.   
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(Appellants’ Opening Br. at 72.)  Their overall case against 
the State Defendant therefore seems to be precisely the kind 
of suit that is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, as it seeks 
“to compensate a party injured in the past by the action of a 
state official,” not to “bring an end to a present, continuing 
violation of federal law.” Blanciak, 77 F.3d at 697-98.    
 
 A closer look at the requested remedy exposes the 
problem.  Plaintiffs ask for an injunction that “requires” the 
Secretary of DPW “to assure” that the state “pays for nursing 
facility provider services” using the pre-SPA rates, and that 
“precludes” DPW “from any further reliance” on SPA 08-
007.  (J.A. at 113.)  In other words, they ask that we require 
DPW to pay the 2008-09 rates in accordance with the 
previously approved state plan, which did not apply a BAF at 
all.  Because SPA 08-007 is no longer in effect, that remedy 
will not help prevent future violations of federal law, and it is 
useful to Plaintiffs only if it “might be offered in state-court 
proceedings as res judicata on the issue of liability, leaving to 
the state courts only a form of accounting proceeding 
whereby damages or restitution would be computed.”  Green, 
474 U.S. at 73.  In fact, the record strongly suggests the 
Plaintiffs will do just that, as they have initiated state 
administrative proceedings requesting that DPW “recalculate” 
the 2008-09 rates “consistent with [the] law.”  
(Administrative Appeal, Doc. 20, Ex. A, at 14.)  The relief 
requested here would therefore “have much the same effect as 
a full-fledged award of damages or restitution by the federal 
court” – forms of relief that are clearly barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment.
30
  Green, 474 U.S. at 73.   
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  The District Court reached a similar conclusion, 
holding that “insofar as [Plaintiffs] request … declaratory 
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 Plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary are unavailing.  
They make no attempt to argue that there is an ongoing 
violation of federal law; rather, they contend that, 
notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment, they are entitled to 
“complete retroactive relief” against the State Defendant.  
(Appellants’ Opening Br. at 68.)  First, they suggest that 
Pennsylvania consented to suit in federal court by 
participating in Medicaid.  That argument clearly fails, as the 
Supreme Court has previously held that a state’s participation 
in Medicaid is not “sufficient to waive the protection of the 
Eleventh Amendment.”  Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. 
v. Fla. Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981).   
 
                                                                                                     
relief that the State Defendant’s implementation” of the SPA 
“violates federal law,” that claim is barred by sovereign 
immunity under Edelman and Green.  Christ the King Manor, 
Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 1:09-cv-2007, at 25 (M.D. Pa. June 29, 
2010).  The Court concluded that Plaintiffs had one viable 
request for prospective relief, however – their request for 
“injunctive relief preventing the State Defendant from basing 
its Medicaid reimbursement payments” on SPA 08-007.  Id.  
But, as described above, that relief cannot be considered 
prospective, because Plaintiffs do not ask that we enjoin a 
continuing violation of federal law, but rather that we require 
DPW to pay nursing facilities using the state plan in effect 
prior to the challenged SPA.  When, as in this case, there is 
no ongoing violation of federal law, the requested injunction 
is effectively a request for a declaration that the prior rate 
calculations were unlawful, and is thus barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment.               
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 Plaintiffs’ second contention is that their claim under 
the APA can somehow include relief against the State 
Defendant.  They say that, when a plaintiff’s Supremacy 
Clause claims “are inextricably intertwined” with an APA 
claim, “the APA claim must be deemed to provide for and 
permit the related resolution” of the Supremacy Clause 
claims.  (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 69.)  But the only 
support Plaintiffs provide for that truly novel proposition is 
the Supreme Court’s recent decision Douglas v. Independent 
Living Center, which held nothing of the sort.  Indeed, 
Douglas strongly suggested that once an APA claim arises 
due to a SPA approval, a Supremacy Clause claim 
challenging the SPA is unsustainable, because allowing “a 
Supremacy Clause action to proceed once the agency has 
reached a decision threatens potential inconsistency or 
confusion.”  132 S. Ct. at 1210.  In any event, Douglas 
certainly did not hold that the presence of a cause of action 
against a federal agency under the APA abrogates a state’s 
immunity from suit in federal court.  
 
 Finally, Plaintiffs say that “the State Defendant is an 
indispensable party” under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.  (Appellants’ Opening Br. at 70.)  Even if 
that were the case (and we express no opinion on the issue), 
being an indispensable party does not affect a state’s 
sovereign immunity.  Under the Eleventh Amendment, an 
unconsenting state cannot be sued in federal court by one of 
its citizens, regardless of whether the state is an essential 
party to the controversy. 
 
 Therefore, as Plaintiffs do not contend that there is an 
ongoing violation of federal law, we conclude that their claim 
against the State Defendant is barred by Eleventh 
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Amendment sovereign immunity.  Accordingly, since we can 
affirm on any basis supported by the record, Travelers Indem. 
Corp. v. Dammann & Co., Inc., 594 F.3d 238, 256 n.12 (3d 
Cir. 2010), we will affirm the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment to the State Defendant.
31
                                  
 
III. Conclusion 
 
 In sum, we will affirm in part and reverse in part the 
District Court’s orders.  Because the State Defendant is 
immune from Plaintiffs’ requested relief under the Eleventh 
Amendment, we will affirm the District Court’s orders 
entering judgment in favor of that defendant.  The District 
Court erred, however, in granting summary judgment to the 
Federal Defendants.  By approving SPA 08-007 without any 
assurance that the amended plan would produce payments 
that are consistent with quality of care, the Secretary of HHS 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and the APA requires that 
we set that approval aside.  Accordingly, we will reverse the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment to the Federal 
Defendants and will remand the case with instructions to 
enter a declaratory judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on their 
claim that HHS’s approval of SPA 08-007 was arbitrary and 
capricious under the APA.  
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  Because we hold that the Eleventh Amendment bars 
all requested relief against the State Defendant, which 
deprives us of subject matter jurisdiction, we do not reach the 
question of whether the District Court properly abstained 
from resolving certain components of Plaintiffs’ claim, nor do 
we consider whether their claim is moot.  
